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I. INTRODUCTION:  THE INSIDIOUS NATURE OF PRE-DISPUTE AGREEMENTS
TO ARBITRATE STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
When the [Federal Arbitration Act] was passed in 1925, I doubt that any legisla-
tor who voted for it expected it to apply to statutory claims, to form contracts
between parties of unequal bargaining power, or to the arbitration of disputes arising
out of the employment relationship.  In recent years, however, the Court “has effec-
tively rewritten the statute,” and abandoned its earlier view that statutory claims were
not appropriate subjects for arbitration.1
These words of United States Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens in
his dissenting opinion from the 1991 decision of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.2 highlight the urgency for those who advocate for changes to the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)3 and the necessity for legislative action
today.4  The Gilmer decision addressed the use of arbitration to resolve statu-
tory employment discrimination claims when employers require their employ-
ees to agree to arbitrate future employment disputes as a condition of
1 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 42-43 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (footnote omitted).  Justice John Paul Stevens has issued a number of key dissents
expressing concerns about the bargaining power involved when an individual employee or a
consumer is required to arbitrate a statutory claim as differentiated from two sophisticated
merchants, and he has consistently argued that Congress could not have intended this result.
See, e.g., id.; Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 486 (1989)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 268 (1987)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 646-50 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Although he did not dissent in the Gilmer
decision, Justice Harry A. Blackmun raised similar concerns about the Court’s changes to
the scope of arbitration enforcement under the FAA before Gilmer. See McMahon, 482 U.S.
at 246-48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2 Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20.
3 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).  “The FAA was originally enacted in 1925, 43 Stat. 883, and
then reenacted and codified in 1947 as Title 9 of the United States Code.” Gilmer, 500 U.S.
at 24.
4 A number of the papers presented at this Symposium advocate for amendments to the
FAA. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, If You Love Arbitration, Set It Free:  How “Mandatory”
Undermines “Arbitration,” 8 NEV. L.J. 400 (2007); Maureen A. Weston, Preserving the
Federal Arbitration Act by Reining in Judicial Expansion and Mandatory Use, 8 NEV. L.J.
385 (2007).  Over the last fifteen years, others have also argued for changes to the FAA that
would address pre-dispute agreements. See, e.g., Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration
Act:  The Supreme Court’s Erroneous Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Propo-
sal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789 (2002).  Even one commentator has asked that the
FAA be amended to clearly endorse pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate. See Frederick L.
Sullivan, Accepting Evolution in Workplace Justice:  The Need for Congress to Mandate
Arbitration, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 281, 284 (2004).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ104.txt unknown Seq: 3 16-JAN-08 13:48
60 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:58
employment—so called pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate.  By allowing the
use of arbitration for statutory employment discrimination claims, the Supreme
Court in the Gilmer decision provided the impetus for a pervasive change in
workplace dispute resolution.  Before Gilmer was decided in 1991, most
employers and employees would not have thought it possible to enforce a pre-
dispute agreement to arbitrate a statutory employment discrimination claim.5
Since Gilmer, the use of arbitration through pre-dispute agreements to resolve
statutory employment discrimination claims has exploded.6
Although many scholars have asserted that pre-dispute agreements to arbi-
trate should not be enforceable,7 the critical thesis of this Essay declares that
Congress must establish measures that create incentives to enter into post-dis-
pute agreements to arbitrate along with any ban on pre-dispute agreements if
any positive effects will ever occur from legislative change.  Because arbitra-
tion has vast potential as an effective dispute resolution tool for workplace dis-
putes and its impact continues to be clouded by the controversy surrounding
pre-dispute agreements, a win-win result can be achieved if Congress focuses
on encouraging and rewarding post-dispute agreements to arbitrate such claims.
This Essay asserts that employees will win by having a fair process that resem-
bles some of the formalities of the court system without the harsh results that
employees obtain through the courts.  Employers, on the other hand, will win
by having a certain and verifiable process that removes their concerns about
unpredictable jury verdicts.
While most scholarly commentary has challenged employer use of pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims,8
5 See Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using
Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 408 & n.26 (2000);
Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration:  Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631,
1637-38 & n.31 (2005).
6 See Sternlight, supra note 5, at 1639-40 & nn.41-43 (declaring “how common” pre-dis-
pute arbitration clauses are in employment and how they “certainly seem ubiquitous”);
Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”:  The Growth and Impact of “Alter-
native Dispute Resolution,” 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843, 900 (2004) (noting that “the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) has claimed that between 1997 and 2002, the num-
ber of employees covered by AAA employment arbitration plans grew from 3 million to 6
million”).
7 A recent example of this argument was made by Professor Richard Bales at this Sympo-
sium. See Christopher J. Kippley & Richard A. Bales, Extending OWBPA Notice and Con-
sent Protections to Arbitration Agreements Involving Employees and Consumers, 8 NEV. L.
J. 10 (2007).  For a number of years, many others, including me, have questioned the propri-
ety of enforcing pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate in the employment and consumer setting
because of concerns about bargaining power and the inability to appreciate that such agree-
ments preclude unsuspecting claimants from seeking relief through the courts. See, e.g.,
David E. Feller, Fender Bender or Train Wreck?:  The Collision Between Statutory Protec-
tion of Individual Employee Rights and the Judicial Revision of the Federal Arbitration Act,
41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 561 (1997); Michael Z. Green, Preempting Justice Through Binding
Arbitration of Future Disputes:  Mere Adhesion Contracts or a Trap For The Unwary Con-
sumer?, 5 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 112, 112 (1993); Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitra-
tion:  Alternative Dispute Resolution or Coercive Dispute Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 131, 131, 135 (1996).
8 Since Gilmer, scores of articles have illuminated many of the critical aspects of pre-dis-
pute agreements to arbitrate employment discrimination claims.  Some of the key articles
that occurred within a few years after Gilmer are listed here to indicate just how pervasive
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an employee’s inability to appreciate the ramifications from giving up the right
to go into court continues to represent a key factor in the criticism of an agree-
ment to arbitrate when made before the dispute occurs.9  In what may suggest a
suspicious conspiracy of interests to many concerned about employees’ rights,
the judicial expansion in Gilmer (by extending enforcement of pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate under the FAA to statutory employment discrimination
claims) occurred the same year in which Congress amended Title VII of the
Civil Right Act of 196410 as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“CRA of
1991”).11  Specifically, the CRA of 1991 provided, for the first time, that
employees bringing claims of intentional discrimination against their employers
under Title VII would have the right to a jury trial and the ability to seek
the criticism has become. See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims:
Rights “Waived” and Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 383-84
(1996); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration:  The Case Against Enforcement of
Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV.
449, 452 (1996); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L.
REV. 33, 37; Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:  Debunking the Supreme
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 678-85 (1996); Ronald
Turner, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims with Special Refer-
ence to the Three A’s—Access, Adjudication, and Acceptability, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
231, 235 (1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employ-
ment Rights:  The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1019
(1996).  The criticism has continued for well more than a decade after Gilmer. See generally
Richard A. Bales, Normative Consideration of Employment Arbitration at Gilmer’s
Quincean˜era, 81 TUL. L. REV. 331, 340-41 (2006); Ellen E. Deason, Perspectives on Deci-
sionmaking from the Blackmun Papers:  The Cases on Arbitrability of Statutory Claims, 70
MO. L. REV. 1133, 1140 (2005) (finding that the Supreme Court’s “expansion [of arbitration
enforcement to statutory claims] is not universally applauded”); Margaret L. Moses, Statu-
tory Misconstruction:  How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never
Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 156-57 (2006) (asserting that the judicial
expansion of the FAA beyond what its drafters could have intended has resulted from policy
choices that prefer the economically powerful such as corporations over consumers and
employers over employees).  However, there are some scholars who do not necessarily agree
with all of the criticism aimed at pre-dispute agreements. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal,
Nonmutual Agreements to Arbitrate, 27 J. CORP. L. 537, 537-41 (2002) (arguing that agree-
ments to arbitrate do not require that one party has to assent at the same level as the other
party and to force mutual assent will make the agreements unfair for consumers and employ-
ees); Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—with Par-
ticular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 254-259,
262-64 (2006) (asserting that pre-dispute agreements should be enforced because they
reduce process costs, especially attorney’s fees, for employees and consumers that would not
be possible through post-dispute agreements).
9 See Lisa B. Bingham, Control over Dispute-System Design and Mandatory Commercial
Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 251 (2004) (asserting that arbitration systems
created through adhesion agreements designed by one party over a weaker party should be
treated “with a healthy dose of skepticism” by the courts because it may “allow[ ] one party
to nullify public policy as embodied in law”).
10 Civil Right Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in perti-
nent part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to 2000e-17 (2000)).
11 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; see also U.S. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991, http://www.
eeoc.gov/policy/cra91.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2007) (providing many of the provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
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compensatory and punitive damage remedies based upon the size of the
employer.12  Accordingly, the insidious nature of pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate becomes extremely transparent if you understand that employers can
merely use their overwhelming bargaining power by requiring their employees
agree to arbitrate any future disputes as a condition of being employed.13
Thereby, employers can unilaterally opt out of the intricate jury trial process
that Congress so meticulously developed under Title VII (as amended by the
CRA of 1991) to resolve employment discrimination claims.14
Part II of this Essay explores the significant expansion of the FAA through
judicial action allowing the enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements
involving statutory employment discrimination claims.  Part III describes the
doubts about the value of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate that have evolved
after more than fifteen years of experience with this process.  Part IV explores
the dynamic of whether employers and employees will be able to have success-
ful post-dispute agreements to arbitrate statutory claims.  Part IV also high-
lights the need for legislative action and offers a proposal that would create
incentives to foster post-dispute agreements to arbitrate these claims by
allowing employers to have predictable expenditures and employees to have a
fair resolution process.  The Essay concludes that if arbitration will ever reach
its potential as an effective tool for resolving statutory employment discrimina-
tion claims, Congress must develop measures that encourage and reward
employers and employees for choosing to enter into post-dispute agreements to
arbitrate.
12 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102, 105 Stat. at 1072-74 (codified in pertinent part at 42
U.S.C. § 1981a (2000)) (granting the right to compensatory and punitive damage remedies
and the right to a jury trial to claimants asserting intentional discrimination under Title VII
while placing caps on recovery of $50,000 for employers with less than 101 employees and
gradual monetary increases corresponding to the increasing number of employees in the
workforce up to a maximum of $300,000 for employers with more than 500 employees).
13 See Scott Baker, A Risk-Based Approach to Mandatory Arbitration, 83 OR. L. REV. 861,
864 & n.10 (2004) (asserting that it is the employers who discriminate the most that seek to
avert their risks of large jury verdicts through arbitration and the employers who tend to not
discriminate will be more willing to take their chances with the courts because arbitration
does not represent a major aversion from a recognizable risk for these employers).
14 See Joseph R. Grodin, On the Interface Between Labor and Employment Law, 19 BERKE-
LEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 307, 310–11 (1998) (noting that it is unusual that the parties regulated
by employment discrimination law, employers, may opt out of that regime by requiring their
employees go to arbitration as a condition of employment); see also Green, supra note 5, at
409 (arguing same); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Dis-
crimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 397 (1999) (asserting that pre-dispute arbi-
tration agreements should not be enforced because a strong public policy in eradicating
workplace discrimination requires a public forum to handle these disputes).
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II. SIGNIFICANT JUDICIAL EXPANSION ALLOWING PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION
OF STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A. Before and Up to Gilmer
In 1953, the Supreme Court decided in Wilko v. Swan15 that a statutory
claim under the Securities Act of 1933 for securities fraud was not subject to
resolution through arbitration under the FAA.16  The Wilko case led to the gen-
eral understanding that statutory claims were not subject to arbitration.  How-
ever, more than thirty years after Wilko, the Supreme Court embarked on a
clear path that would eventually broaden the scope of the FAA significantly
and lead the court to overrule Wilko.  Those changes culminated with its
landmark Gilmer decision in 1991 allowing pre-dispute arbitration of statutory
employment discrimination claims.
Probably the first direct step in the Supreme Court’s actions that would
reverse the Wilko case and eventually lead to wholesale application of the FAA
to enforce arbitration of statutory disputes occurred in 1985 with the decision in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.17  The Court in Mit-
subishi held that statutory antitrust claims brought in the context of an interna-
tional contract dispute between an automobile distributor in Puerto Rico and a
Japanese vehicle manufacturer were subject to arbitration under the FAA.18
Although the Mitsubishi case might have become a limited exception pertain-
ing to solely international matters, in the 1987 case Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon,19 the Court found that a solely domestic dispute
involving a claim brought pursuant to the Exchange Act of 1934 and RICO
statutes was subject to arbitration under the FAA because the holding in Wilko
was limited to concerns about statutory claims under the Securities Act of
1933.20  In its 1989 decision, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc.,21 the Supreme Court expressly rejected the holding in Wilko and
found that a claim brought pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 was subject to
arbitration under the FAA as arbitration represented an adequate forum in
which parties could resolve such statutory disputes.22
The next major step in the Court’s expansion of the FAA to statutory
claims occurred in the Gilmer decision in 1991.23  As a condition of employ-
ment as a financial manager for Interstate/Johnson Lane, Gilmer had to sign a
15 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
16 Id. at 434-35.
17 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
Although the Court probably signaled its expansive arbitration efforts in the international
setting when it allowed for arbitration of an Exchange Act claim in an international dispute
as early as 1974, it took great aims to distinguish Wilko in that case.  See Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974).  Starting with the Mitsubishi case in 1985, the
Court’s hostility to Wilko became quite evident.
18 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626.
19 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
20 Id. at 228-29.
21 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
22 Id. at 484-86.
23 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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registration application with the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) requir-
ing that he arbitrate any dispute with his employer.24  Because he signed the
application with the arbitration provision, his employer filed a motion to com-
pel arbitration years later when Gilmer sued under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”).25  Applying the analysis from Mitsubishi and its
progeny, the Court enforced the pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate under the
FAA and stated:  “It is by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of
an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA.”26  Pursuant to the
FAA and relying on its Mitsubishi precedent, the Supreme Court in Gilmer
compelled the arbitration of the employment discrimination claim brought
under the ADEA statute and found that the plaintiff could “‘effectively . . .
vindicate [his] . . . statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.’”27
Thus, it took merely six years from its 1985 Mitsubishi opinion to the
1991 Gilmer decision for the Supreme Court to change significantly the arbitra-
tion of statutory claims by its expanded analysis of the FAA.  The impact from
the Court’s decision to reverse Wilko after nearly thirty-five years of long-
standing precedent presents an interesting question regarding the Court’s role
when Congress has given no indication that a change in statutory interpretation
is warranted.28  The Court’s reversal actions tended to violate “standard canons
of statutory construction” that would “normally give rise to a presumption of
congressional approval” when Congress had not acted for several years to cor-
rect any prior precedent.29
B. After Gilmer
The Gilmer decision was not just criticized by academics.  In 1997, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), the agency charged
with enforcement of most of the primary federal laws banning employment
discrimination including Title VII,30 issued a policy statement criticizing the
24 Id. at 23.
25 Id. at 23–24.  The ADEA can be found at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
26 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.  Unfortunately, by this time and due to the prior precedents, even
the members of the Court who had become frustrated with the Court’s expansion of the FAA
to statutory claims found the extension to statutory employment discrimination claims in
Gilmer an inevitable result. See Deason, supra note 8, at 1177-79 (reviewing notes of Jus-
tice Harry Blackmun regarding the deliberations in the Gilmer decision and suggesting that
the pro-arbitration stance for statutory claims that the Court had adopted in Mitsubishi
seemed to foreclose any efforts to prevent statutory employment discrimination claims from
also being arbitrated under the FAA, and also suggesting that the prior precedent indicated
why Justice Blackmun did not file a separate dissent in Gilmer).
27 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi as support for the Court’s decision).
28 See Deason, supra note 8, at 1138 (discussing how the Court’s decision to reverse prior
precedent finding statutory claims to not be arbitrable would instead “abrogate[ ] an interpre-
tation that had been solidly entrenched in the law and not altered by Congress”).
29 Id.
30 See U.S. EEOC, Laws Enforced by the EEOC, www.eeoc.gov/policy/laws.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Laws Enforced by the EEOC] (referring to the following
laws, among others, that the EEOC enforces:  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended (“Title VII”) (EEOC enforcement authority codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to e-5
& e-12 (2000)); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”) (EEOC enforce-
ment authority codified at 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000)); and Title I of the Americans With Disa-
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use of pre-dispute arbitration to resolve statutory employment discrimination
claims.31
Despite the criticism of Gilmer, including those points raised by the
EEOC in its policy statement, the Supreme Court has expanded the significance
of its holding while also leaving many unanswered questions regarding the
enforcement of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate employment discrimination
claims.32  As an example of one of the many unanswered questions, in 1974 the
Court decided Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.33 and held that claims
brought pursuant to Title VII could not be compelled into arbitration under a
provision to arbitrate made within a collective bargaining agreement between a
company and a union representing its employees.34  Whether Gilmer had
essentially overruled Gardner-Denver was a question that could have been
answered by the Court in its 1998 decision, Wright v. Universal Maritime Ser-
vice Corp.35  Although the Supreme Court acknowledged a difference between
the Gilmer and Gardner-Denver decisions and required an unmistakable
waiver before a court could compel arbitration of an individual employee’s
statutory employment claim in the union setting, it did not explain exactly what
would be required to effectuate such a waiver.36
bilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) (EEOC enforcement authority codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12116
(2000))).
31 See U.S. EEOC, Notice No. 915.002, Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitra-
tion of Employment Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment (July 10, 1997),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.html.  Professor Richard Bales has
interpreted the EEOC policy to include eight reasons for its opposition to pre-dispute arbitra-
tion including:  1) inability to develop judicial precedents; 2) lack of deterrent effect because
arbitration awards are not published; 3) limited judicial review prevents courts from cor-
recting any errors by arbitrators involving statutory interpretation; 4) waiver of the right to a
jury trial; 5) the availability of only limited discovery; 6) the employer has a structural
advantage as a repeat player in the selection of the arbitrator and potential influence on the
arbitrator due to the possible need to select the arbitrator for future cases; 7) improper influ-
ence by the employer as the party with the most bargaining power in drafting one-sided
agreements; and 8) inability of the EEOC to perform its role as employees would not be able
to file charges.  Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Arbitration and the EEOC, 27 PEPP. L. REV.
1, 20-26 (1999).  Unfortunately, the EEOC has focused a lot of its energy on mediation over
the last ten years rather than continuing to address the concerns raised by its 1997 policy
against pre-dispute arbitration. See generally Michael Z. Green, Ruminations About the
EEOC’s Policy Regarding Arbitration, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 154 (2007) (criticiz-
ing the EEOC’s inaction with respect to addressing arbitration issues since its 1997 policy
statement and suggesting many reasons for this inaction including the EEOC’s enthusiastic
endorsement of and increased focus on mediation).
32 See generally Bales, supra note 8, at 340-41 (describing events over the last fifteen years
regarding enforcement of arbitration agreements as a condition of employment regarding
statutory employment disputes).
33 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
34 Id. at 50 (“The distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory rights is not
vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the same factual occurrence.  And
certainly no inconsistency results from permitting both rights to be enforced in their respec-
tively appropriate forums.”).
35 Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
36 Id. at 79–80.
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Then in its 2001 decision, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,37 the
Supreme Court adopted its broadest application of the FAA to employment
disputes by narrowly interpreting the language from section 1 of the FAA,
which excludes certain “contracts of employment” from FAA coverage.38  The
Court interpreted the “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” language at
the end of section 1 as limiting its exclusion to those contracts of employment
for workers who literally work in transportation or commerce while allowing
the application of the FAA to essentially any other type of employment con-
tract.39  The Supreme Court’s most recent discussion of the arbitration of
employment discrimination claims occurred five years ago in its 2002 decision,
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.40  The Court found that the EEOC could still pur-
sue all forms of statutory relief in court even if individual employees had
agreed to arbitrate through a pre-dispute agreement.41  Under Waffle House, an
employer may still have to defend a discrimination claim in court even if the
employee allegedly being discriminated against had agreed to arbitrate.  The
Court reasoned that because the EEOC is not a party to the agreement to arbi-
trate and it operates as a public enforcement agency charged with addressing
employment discrimination, the EEOC may independently decide which suits
to bring against employers in court to vindicate broader public interests.42
One of the flaws in the expansion of the FAA to statutory employment
discrimination claims involves the flimsy statutory support for Congress’s
desire to enforce pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate these claims.  The lack of
legislative support to suggest that Congress would want employers to so easily
require arbitration for employees was definitely palpable in 1991 when Gilmer
was decided.  Congress had just undergone Herculean efforts to provide
employment discrimination claimants with the statutory right to a jury trial
through the CRA of 1991.  Yet, in one fell swoop after Gilmer, the Supreme
Court has allowed that right to a jury trial to be limited through pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate, which employers can use to require that their employ-
ees have these claims decided by an arbitrator rather than a jury.43  Although it
may be exceedingly difficult to discern what Congress could have thought
about enforcing pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate such statutory claims when
it enacted the FAA in 1925, the Supreme Court consistently found agreements
to arbitrate statutory claims unenforceable for decades after the FAA was
passed.  If there was a need for change, the Supreme Court should have left that
change in the hands of Congress.
Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court expanded the scope of its enforcement
regarding pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate statutory claims under the FAA
37 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
38 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (“[N]othing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.”).
39 Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 118-19.
40 EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
41 Id. at 292, 297-98.
42 Id. at 294-96.
43 See Sternlight, supra note 5, at 1643; Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration
and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 669, 669-70 (2001).
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over the last twenty years, Congress has failed to articulate its clear view on
this matter—effectively abdicating any responsibility for determining the inter-
secting strictures regarding employment discrimination and arbitration and
leaving it solely within the hands of the courts.  As of 2007, Congress must
start to address this expanded coverage under the FAA of pre-dispute agree-
ments to arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims from Gilmer and
identify exactly how arbitration of these claims should be encouraged in light
of what both employers and employees have learned from their arbitration
experience since Gilmer.
III. ONGOING DOUBTS ABOUT ARBITRATION’S CONTINUED VITALITY
A. Employer Doubts About the Value of Pre-Dispute Agreements
Over the last fifteen years, as the number of pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate has increased, many advantages have been claimed for employers
including savings in time and costs, privacy, end of nuisance value settlements,
encouraging early settlement, and most importantly removing fear and uncer-
tainty about unpredictable and large jury verdicts.44  On the other hand, a num-
ber of disadvantages for employers have also been asserted about pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate including the following:  some instances where costs
are exorbitant and time is extensive; lack of formal discovery; lack of applica-
tion of the rules of evidence; last minute surprises; public and employee rela-
tions concerns; limited review/challenge; union organizing incentives; the
inability to block the EEOC from pursuing claims; and the existence of many
legal challenges to fairness that still keep employers in the court system despite
the arbitration clause.45  And while it may not represent a specific disadvanta-
geous result from arbitration, one of the biggest threats to the use of arbitration
continues to be the increasingly strong preference of employers to pursue medi-
ation much more than arbitration.46
In assessing these advantages and disadvantages after fifteen years of
experience, some employers have started to question whether arbitration
remains a preferred option for resolving employment discrimination claims.47
With still many unsettled issues in terms of legal enforcement of pre-dispute
44 See Green, supra note 31, at 174 (describing employer advantages in pursuing
arbitration).
45 Id. at 174-76 (describing employer disadvantages in pursuing arbitration).
46 See Vivian Berger, Employment Mediation in the Twenty-First Century:  Challenges in a
Changing Environment, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 487, 507-13 (2003) (discussing the
increasing popularity of mediation to resolve employment disputes); Michael Z. Green,
Tackling Employment Discrimination with ADR:  Does Mediation Offer a Shield for the
Haves or Real Opportunity for the Have-Nots?, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 321, 331-34
(2005) (describing how mediation is becoming a preferred tool for employment dispute reso-
lution); see also Leslie A. Gordon, Clause for Alarm:  As Arbitration Costs Rise, In-House
Counsel Turn to Mediation or a Combined Approach, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2006, at 19 (describ-
ing how in-house counsel are starting to become more interested in mediation instead of
arbitration to handle employment disputes).
47 See Gordon, supra note 46, at 19 (describing how in-house counsel are becoming more
familiar with the impacts from pre-dispute arbitration clauses and are starting to become
more disenchanted with arbitration to handle employment disputes).
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agreements to arbitrate and general questions about the overall adequacy of
arbitration versus mediation, employers may be ready to resist any continued
growth in the use of arbitration in any matter, especially the resolution of
employment discrimination claims.  A recent empirical study of contracts
involving publicly-held companies suggests that corporations fail to see much
value in using arbitration when dealing with each other and rarely use it as
compared with their increasing use of arbitration in their dealings with individ-
ual employees and consumers.48  With the increasing dissatisfaction of compa-
nies with arbitration for individuals, we may be at a point in corporate
employment dispute resolution where arbitration may no longer have an
impact.
B. Employee Doubts About the Value of Pre-Dispute Agreements
Employees may also have a number of advantages that may arise in arbi-
tration whether it is entered into pre-dispute or post-dispute, including savings
in time and costs while providing a better chance for resolution and voice than
in the courts, which offer dismal results especially due to the summary judg-
ment pre-trial resolution process.49  On the other hand, employees must con-
front a number of disadvantages that are exacerbated by the pre-dispute
agreement process:  the coercion/involuntary nature of the agreement due to
lack of bargaining power; lack of formality, including rules of discovery or
evidence and sometimes no detailed written opinions; lack of attorney represen-
tation; limited judicial review and no public precedent; repeat player concerns;
lack of public vindication or constitutional guarantees; and no statutory protec-
tions regarding the arbitrator selection process as compared to the courts for
judge and jury selection.50
Although there have been many efforts to assess the value of arbitration
for employees,51 few studies have focused on the employees’ reactions to being
in a pre-dispute arbitration.  One study did analyze the viewpoints of employ-
ees who had participated in arbitration under pre-dispute agreements at two
companies, Travelers Corporation (now Citigroup) and Cigna Corporation.52
48 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration:  An Empirical
Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56
DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 367-68 (2007) (asserting that very few corporations choose arbitration
as a dispute resolution tool when they enter into transactions with each other, but use them
often to require that individuals must arbitrate claims against them).
49 Green, supra note 31, at 176; see also Vivian Berger et al., Summary Judgment
Benchmarks for Settling Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 45, 48-49 (2005) (describing challenges for employees in resolving employment dis-
crimination claims due to difficulties in the court system under the summary judgment
process).
50 Green, supra note 31, at 176-80.
51 See, e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration:  Clar-
ity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405 (2007); Michael H.
LeRoy, Getting Nothing for Something:  When Women Prevail in Employment Arbitration
Awards, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 573 (2005); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice:  Employ-
ment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29 (1998).
52 See E. Patrick McDermott & Ruth Obar, Workplace Dispute Resolution After Circuit
City:  A Complainant’s Perspective on Employer Dispute Resolution Programs Requiring
Mandatory Arbitration, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 1157 (2002).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ104.txt unknown Seq: 12 16-JAN-08 13:48
Fall 2007] POST-DISPUTE AGREEMENTS 69
The researchers who conducted this study focused on the employees’ percep-
tions of fairness and the effectiveness of the process in resolving their claims.
They mailed a questionnaire to all employees who had filed a complaint under
the Travelers and Cigna dispute resolution programs over a two-year period.53
They received a 31% response rate or a total of 38 actual responses from Cigna
complainants and a 39% response rate or a total of 43 actual responses from
Travelers complainants.54  The results indicated that for “both programs, the
number of persons who proceeded to arbitration was less than 5% of all com-
plainants.”55  The researchers conducting the study concluded that the com-
plainants did not consider the procedures as fair or effective unless they
obtained the result that they had been seeking.56  They also concluded that if
the procedures were fair and if employees’ concerns about procedural due pro-
cess were satisfied, then the employees were more willing to recommend the
arbitration program to other employees.57  Although there was some perception
of fairness in the employees having their day before the arbitrator, the most
significant factor derived from the researchers was their ultimate finding that
employee satisfaction with pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate primarily ended
up being outcome determinative.58
According to some scholars, any ongoing analysis about the impact on
employees from agreements to arbitrate still requires more empirical study.59
Getting the empirical data may be easier said than done.  Absent the existence
of a solid database in which you can compare arbitration with court resolution,
employees cannot make informed decisions as to whether a pre-dispute agree-
ment to arbitrate would represent a wise decision.60  Thus, even though some
scholars have asserted the need for more empirical data, a concern remains
about whether the data sets to compare information about employment arbitra-
tion versus litigation can offer enough input to develop any definitive
conclusions.61
53 Id. at 1169.
54 Id. at 1169 & nn.73-74.
55 Id. at 1174.
56 Id. at 1187.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 1189.
59 See, e.g., David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration:  A New
Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (2005) (asserting the need for new
directions in the development of empirical research regarding employment arbitration).
60 See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Dispute Resolution:  The Case for Mediation, 22
CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 145, 161 (2004) (asserting the importance of well-designed and
matched data sets to compare arbitration with litigation because “[t]his is information policy-
makers need in order to decide how to address competing claims about efficiency or bias in
mandatory [pre-dispute] employment arbitration”).
61 See Bales, supra note 8, at 351-52 (describing difficulties in gathering and analyzing data
from empirical studies that have been conducted regarding the effect of arbitration on
employees due to small sample sizes and high standard deviations); Stephen J. Ware, The
Effects of Gilmer:  Empirical and Other Approaches to the Study of Employment Arbitra-
tion, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 735, 736 (2001) (identifying problems with sparse
empirical information regarding employment arbitration and suggesting that the information
that does exist offers little help in understanding the parameters of employment arbitration
analysis).
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C. Prospects for Future Use
Despite the criticism and doubts about pre-dispute agreements involving
statutory employment discrimination claims, arbitration, as a whole, may still
represent an effective mechanism to resolve these disputes.62  After comparing
whatever data sets that exist regarding results from arbitration of employment
disputes with the results from the court system process, employees should not
be in such a rush to criticize arbitration.63  Although major concerns still exist
regarding whether anyone has been able to obtain sufficient empirical data
comparing arbitration results with litigation,64 the court system provides such
dire possibilities that virtually any other process would provide a hopeful
option.65
62 See, e.g., Roberto L. Corrada, Claiming Private Law for the Left:  Exploring Gilmer’s
Impact and Legacy, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1051, 1069 (1996); Charles B. Craver, The Use of
Non-Judicial Procedures to Resolve Employment Discrimination Claims, 11 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 141, 158 (2001); Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws:  The Stakes in the
Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 559, 563-64 (2001); David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of
Employment Disputes:  Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bathwater, and Constructing a
New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 99-100 (1999); Theodore J. St.
Antoine, Gilmer in the Collective Bargaining Context, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 491,
499 (2001); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration of Employee Discrimination
Claims:  Unmitigated Evil or Blessing in Disguise?, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 1-9 (1998).
63 See Green, supra note 46, at 327-30 (suggesting benefits for employees in pursuing arbi-
tration given the harsh results presented by the court system).  In 1998, Lewis Maltby ana-
lyzed comparative data between results in arbitration versus results in litigation as follows:
“Comparisons of the result rates in arbitration versus litigation reveal that, contrary to what
many would expect, employees prevail more often in arbitration than in court.”  Maltby,
supra note 51, at 46 (finding that employees prevailed in up to 63% of cases in arbitration
versus less that 15% in the courts); see also LeRoy, supra note 51, at 576 (asserting from
empirical analysis that employees tend to win in arbitration at a much higher percentage than
in the courts although men tend to win more “full awards” than women in arbitration).  More
recently, Alexander Colvin has analyzed a data set of employment arbitrations held through
the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) in California and found employee win rates
of 21.8%. See Colvin, supra note 51 (describing a sample of 1779 employment cases
administered by the AAA in California from Jan. 1, 2003 - Sept. 30, 2006, which produced
349 employment arbitration awards).  Colvin asserts that his figures indicate much lower
employee win rates for employees in arbitration as compared to prior studies because the
type of claims involved in these arbitrations now include a higher number of statutory
employment discrimination disputes. Id.
64 See Bingham, supra note 60, at 161 (asserting that “[t]he field needs a well-designed
empirical examination of how arbitration compares to the traditional litigation process, pref-
erably using random assignment or matched pairs of cases”).
65 See Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing:  Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 889, 894 (2006) (finding from an empirical study of court cases alleging
employment discrimination based on race and national origin that “[t]he bottom line for all
cases studied is simple:  plaintiffs almost always lose when courts resolve their claims”);
Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L.
REV. 555, 560-61 (2001) (asserting that employers prevail in 98% of federal court employ-
ment discrimination cases resolved at the pretrial stage).  Professor Kevin Clermont, along
with his co-authors, has also captured through empirical data the extreme difficulties that
employees face in seeking to prevail when bringing employment discrimination claims in the
federal courts. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimina-
tion Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 451-52 (2004)
(describing “a troublesome anti-plaintiff effect in federal appellate courts” for employment
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IV. ADDRESSING THE SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR ARBITRATION OF
STATUTORY CLAIMS THROUGH POST-DISPUTE AGREEMENTS
As it stands in 2007 and after more than fifteen years of judicial prece-
dents since Gilmer, arbitration in the workplace has reached a critical juncture.
Both employers and employees have started to become disenchanted with a
number of its aspects.  Employers, employees, and legislators know by now
that many questions remain in terms of employer and employee doubts about
the value of pursuing arbitration through pre-dispute agreements.  Congress
must finally take some action as part of an overall rescue mission if arbitration
can continue to become a major force in resolving employment discrimination
disputes.  That mission must provide concrete measures that encourage
employers and employees to choose fair arbitration processes after a dispute
arises.
Pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate remain the bane of arbitration’s exis-
tence when it comes to statutory employment discrimination claims.  In addi-
tion to the tremendous criticism from academics and the EEOC, the plaintiff’s
bar continues to address many legal challenges that remain.66  Given that Con-
gress has failed to clarify the impact of the FAA when addressing pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims, concerns
about such agreements will likely continue to spiral.  And this may not bode
well for the ongoing use of arbitration in resolving statutory employment dis-
crimination claims as the initial employer enthusiasm for arbitration may be
starting to wane for many reasons.  Because arbitration has real potential as a
fair mechanism for employment discrimination claimants, its potential loss
could represent a major blow to those seeking opportunities for vindication of
rights under statutory employment discrimination regimes.
As we reach a crucial time for reflection on the impact of the FAA in
resolving employment discrimination claims, eliminating pre-dispute agree-
ments from the analysis would allow a proper focus on how to leverage the
benefits of arbitration.  All the hostility and controversy has focused on pre-
discrimination claimants along with a bias against plaintiffs at the trial level); Kevin M.
Clermont et al., How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 547 (2003); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisen-
berg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts:  Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable
Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947.
66 See Cliff Palefsky, Only a Start:  ADR Provider Ethics Principles Don’t Go Far Enough,
DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2001, at 18, 20-23 (describing criticism of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements by plaintiff’s attorney who has consistently challenged their enforcement and
raising concerns about the inability of the parties and the free market system to regulate
arbitrators’ neutrality and ethics given that employers who are satisfied with arbitrators’
performance will want to select those arbitrators repeatedly and thereby give a large volume
of business to only those arbitrators); Richard C. Reuben, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses
Under Fire, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 58, 58-59 (asserting challenges by the National
Employment Lawyers Association (“NELA”), a group comprised primarily of plaintiff’s
employment lawyers, and how they initially threatened a boycott of arbitration service prov-
iders that offered arbitration through pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate statutory employ-
ment discrimination claims).  Congress must address employees’ concerns about fair
arbitrator selection processes and provide challenges to the selection of the arbitrator as with
jurors in the court system.
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dispute agreements and taking that red herring out of the equation can allow an
opportunity to evaluate the impact of arbitration effectively.  Also, because the
enforcement of Title VII occurs primarily through private lawsuits, if Congress
can turn its focus to fostering post-dispute agreements, it will remove concerns
about the insidious nature of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate from the dis-
cussion while establishing legislative intent regarding this important issue.
A concern with focusing on a process that does not allow enforcement of
pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate could be that employers and employees find
no motivation ever to enter into post-dispute agreements to arbitrate.  If this
concern is correct, that result would effectively lead to the end of arbitration of
employment discrimination claims because no parties would agree to use it
after a dispute arises.  Accordingly, the question of whether employers and
employees will have the same motivations to enter into agreements after a dis-
pute arises will control the value of post-dispute agreements to arbitrate.  A
number of scholars have asserted that employers and employees have little
incentive to enter into post-dispute agreements to arbitrate.67  However, the
reality of this claim has not been effectively established to date and may end up
being merely speculative.68
Few question the propriety of settling disputes after they arise, and agree-
ing to arbitrate under those circumstances would have the same value.  Many
times employees and employers reach confidential agreements to settle claims,
and these agreements are made after a dispute arises.69  If post-dispute agree-
67 See generally Baker, supra note 13 (asserting post-dispute agreements do not raise the
same incentive concerns as pre-dispute agreements); Estreicher, supra note 62, at 567 (find-
ing post-dispute agreements to be an “illusory” alternative); Lewis L. Maltby, Out of the
Frying Pan, Into the Fire:  The Feasibility of Post-Dispute Employment Arbitration Agree-
ments, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 313 (2003) (enforcing post-dispute agreements to arbi-
trate will not work well in practice); David Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two:  Why Post-
Dispute Voluntary Arbitration Programs Will Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with
Employment Discrimination Law Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2003)
(asserting post-dispute agreements to arbitrate are unwise and not likely to occur); Ware,
supra note 8, at 262-64 (asserting that employees and consumers gain by lowering transac-
tion costs through pre-dispute agreements and that gain would not be possible with post-
dispute agreements). But see Matthew T. Bodie, Questions About the Efficiency of Employ-
ment Arbitration Agreements, 39 GA. L. REV. 1, 46 (2004) (asserting that post-dispute agree-
ments to arbitrate provide a much more economically efficient result for employees than pre-
dispute agreements while acknowledging that there may be important societal benefits over
time if employers choose to take on all the costs involved with arbitration).  For further
description of some of these arguments asserting that employers and employees have little
incentive to enter into post-dispute agreements to arbitrate, see infra Part IV.A.
68 See Sternlight, supra note 5, at 1658-59 (questioning the validity of the arguments by
those who assert that post-dispute agreements to arbitrate are unlikely).
69 See Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy:  A New Economic Analysis of Confidential Set-
tlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 877 n.46 (2007) (describing incentives that parties have to
settle cases and referring to “data from the federal courts” identifying that “ninety-eight
percent of all civil cases and ninety-five percent of criminal cases settle through agreement
of the parties or are withdrawn from the court without a final court decision”) (citation
omitted)); Robert J. Rhee, The Effect of Risk on Legal Valuation, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 193,
226 & n.131 (2007) (“In the real world, however, trial is a highly infrequent event, and most
cases settle.”).  However, the fact that settlement occurs at such a high level has also raised
questions as to whether settlement should be discouraged. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Set-
tlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1089 (1984) (stressing the importance of a public resolution
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ments to arbitrate can operate in a similar fashion to settlement agreements in
terms of general support for this method of resolving a dispute, then Congress
should adopt measures to encourage employers and employees to agree to arbi-
tration after a dispute arises.  Given how controversial enforcement of pre-dis-
pute agreements has become and especially due to the dynamics posed by the
jury trial and advanced remedies made available to employment discrimination
claimants pursuant to the CRA of 1991, Congress must address the dilemmas
involved with arbitrating these statutory disputes.
A. Assessing the Scholarly Criticism of Post-Dispute Agreements to
Arbitrate Statutory Employment Discrimination Claims
A comprehensive analysis of the arguments that have been made as to why
employers and employees have little incentive to enter into post-dispute agree-
ments is beyond the scope of this Essay.  However, an empirical study by
David Sherwyn focuses on the motivations of employment attorneys in the Chi-
cago area and provides background for understanding the critical analysis by
those who question the propriety of focusing on post-dispute agreements to
arbitrate:
Invariably, what is advantageous to one is disadvantageous to the other.  Attorneys
are hesitant to take any action that could signal weakness to the other side or hinder
his or her chances of obtaining a desirable outcome.  Parties are wise to consider not
only the technical advantages and disadvantages of arbitration, but also the psycho-
logical effects of suggesting (or agreeing voluntarily to) an alternative forum.  It may
be the case that parties are reluctant to offer to arbitrate when either the underlying
facts of their case appear weak or the opposition aggressively postures its willingness
and readiness to proceed to trial.70
Although Sherwyn focused on the views of employment attorneys, Lewis
Maltby looked at the views of corporate attorneys and, importantly, their corpo-
rate clients when he conducted an empirical study of American Arbitration
Association employment arbitration files from its New York office in 2001 and
found that post-dispute agreements to arbitrate employment claims were rare.71
In his survey, Maltby also found that corporate attorneys do not want to arbi-
trate after a dispute arises because they believe either cases will be resolved
through pre-trial proceedings or the employee cannot afford the costs of litiga-
tion.72  Interestingly, Maltby also found that the corporate clients did not like to
agree to arbitration after a dispute arises because similar to settlement, these
clients were resistant to resolving a case early.73
Many of the arguments asserting that employers and employees will not
agree to arbitrate after a dispute arises express similar concerns about the lack
over private settlement). But see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?:  A
Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663,
2669-70 (1995) (arguing that settlement and other dispute resolution choices should fall
within the province of party determination and should not be denigrated as a viable option
even before a dispute has occurred).
70 Sherwyn, supra note 67, at 37.
71 Maltby, supra note 67, at 319.
72 Id. at 324-28.
73 Id.
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of economic incentives and purported cost savings that may exist before a dis-
pute arises as opposed to after it arises.74  However, it is surprising that this
same analysis of purported benefits in agreements to arbitrate before a dispute
arises does not match the limited empirical analysis suggesting that corpora-
tions rarely enter into pre-dispute agreements with each other.75  And there is
also some empirical analysis that shows that corporations rarely enter into post-
dispute agreements to arbitrate with each other.76
Thus, the issue appears to be more about what motivates corporations to
enter into agreements to arbitrate, in general, rather than assuming that employ-
ers will only agree to pre-dispute agreements with their employees and not do
so after a dispute arises.  Much of the criticism of post-dispute agreements to
arbitrate results from an economic incentives analysis asserting that either the
employee or the employer will not want to enter into a bad deal once either
knows the nature of the employee’s complaint and can assess the strengths and
weaknesses of the employer’s potential defenses.77
However, the decisions of employers are not rationally based and rather
operate more from uninformed fears about the risks of litigation.78  Further-
more, if we analogize the decisionmaking process for post-dispute agreements
to arbitrate with decisions to settle where both sides can better assess the
strengths and weaknesses of a claim, one will find that settlement decisions fail
74 See, e.g., Ware, supra note 8, at 262-64.  General arguments that choosing arbitration
represents a sound economic choice because it offers a social good have also been asserted.
See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims:  An Economic
Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 212-13 (2000) (discussing economic incentives to
choose arbitration); Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution:  An Economic Analysis,
24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 8 (1995) (same).
75 See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 48, at 367.
76 Maltby, supra note 67, at 321-23.
77 Estreicher, supra note 62, at 567-68 (asserting that agreeing to arbitrate would have an
economic effect on settlement by taking off the table the effect of a jury trial); Maltby, supra
note 67, at 314 (asserting that employees have little chance of convincing employers to give
up the chance for resolution in court and instead arbitrate due to the costs involved);
Sherwyn, supra note 67, at 57 (arguing that attorneys for plaintiffs and employers will rarely
agree to arbitrate the same case); Ware, supra note 8, at 263 (“Neither party is likely to
agree, post-dispute, to arbitrate claims for which arbitration is expected to be less favorable
to that party than litigation would be.”).
78 Green, supra note 5, at 454-59 (describing concerns about jury verdicts—albeit based on
little supporting data and unrealistic fears due to a few highly publicized awards—as the
concern of employers that led the rush into the use of arbitration); Maltby, supra note 67, at
326-27 (describing how clients rarely make pragmatic evaluations at the “beginning of a
dispute”).  In a recent empirical study of nearly sixty United States corporations where the
motivations of managers and attorneys in using ADR were surveyed, “interviewees hardly
ever uttered the word ‘fairness’” and “almost always reported that their major motivation
was to avoid the costs associated with resolving disputes in court . . . .” See David B.
Lipsky, Resolving Workplace Conflict:  The Alternative Dispute Resolution Revolution and
Some Lessons We Have Learned, 10 PERSP. ON WORK 11, 12 & n.3  (2007) (citing DAVID
LIPSKY ET AL., EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING WORKPLACE CONFLICT:  LESSONS FROM
AMERICAN CORPORATIONS FOR MANAGERS AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROFESSIONALS
(2003)).  However, it appears that these motivations are not dispute-specific and are just
based on generalized notions about the high costs of litigation.  Maltby, supra note 67, at
326-27.
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to follow typical economic analysis.79  Thus, as Jean Sternlight has asserted:
“Voluntary postdispute arbitration is not impossible. . . .  [R]ather than dismiss
the possibility of voluntary postdispute arbitration, we should consider what
changes or regulations might be necessary to make this a reality in the United
States.”80  Essentially, the changes that will be necessary must address employ-
ers’ concerns about cost and predictability and employees’ similar concerns
about costs, while also offering a fair forum in which employees have all the
same substantive rights as in courts and the potential to pursue all procedural
rights that may have an effect on their substantive rights.
B. Providing Incentives to Enter into Post-Dispute Agreements to Arbitrate
Statutory Employment Discrimination Claims
Although it remains an open question, if post-dispute agreements are not
likely to occur as some have argued, then Congress should adopt incentives for
post-dispute agreements to arbitrate in support of the FAA’s strong policy sup-
porting arbitration.  Congress can create effective measures to reward employ-
ers by limiting punitive damages and unpredictable costs along with attorney’s
fees by offering a fair arbitration agreement after a dispute arises.  Employees
will have an incentive to use arbitration after a dispute arises if they can fairly
choose the arbitrator and obtain a fast and effective resolution in a relatively
cost-effective manner as compared to the difficulties that arise when pursuing a
claim through the courts.  Then arbitration will work just as well for the parties
when agreed to even after a dispute arises.
1. Rewarding Employers:  Waiving Punitive Damages and Costs
Employers’ biggest fear regarding resolution of employment discrimina-
tion claims continues to be the unpredictability of large jury verdicts.81
Employers do not seem to act rationally by agreeing to settle or pursue arbitra-
tion given their tremendous success rates in the courts.82  However, certainty of
not having a large jury verdict by being in arbitration seems to provide more of
an incentive to employers than the minimal likelihood that such a jury verdict
will occur in the courts.  With punitive damages being the most uncertain
aspect of a jury trial, if that component could be more reliably quantified in a
79 See Rhee, supra note 69, at 227 (finding economic theory suggesting that parties have the
highest incentives to settle early does not match “empirical observation” that demonstrates
“[s]ettlements occur at all stages of litigation, seemingly at random points in time” and many
at a point “when virtually all transaction costs have been expended”).
80 Sternlight, supra note 5, at 1658.
81 See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 317 (“Much of the advocating for arbitration on the part of
employers results from verdicts that have been pursued before sympathetic-to-employee and
hostile-to-employer juries in proceedings that have become known as ‘workplace lotter-
ies.’”); see also David T. Lo´pez, Realizing the Promise of Employment Arbitration, 69 TEX.
B. J. 862, 862 (2006) (“Employers have opted for mandatory, binding arbitration of employ-
ment disputes as a way to avoid the fear of disproportionate jury awards or jury bias, among
other reasons.”).
82 See Green, supra note 5, at 454-59 (describing how employers ignore the tremendous
success rate in the courts due to worries about unlikely jury verdicts and how those concerns
led employers to start using arbitration right after jury trials became possible for discrimina-
tion claims brought under Title VII).
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particular dispute resolution process, employers would have more of an incen-
tive to follow that process.  Accordingly, if Congress really values arbitration
as a dispute resolution tool for statutory employment discrimination claims, it
could amend Title VII by giving employers an affirmative defense to punitive
damages and the possibility of attorney’s fees as costs in the court system if
employers offered post-dispute arbitration and the employee refused it.83  This
concept would be modeled in some aspects after Rule 68 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, Offers of Judgment, which can cut off costs and attorney’s
fees when a party makes a written offer of judgment and it is refused by the
other party who later does not receive as much in court as would have been
received by accepting the offer of judgment.84
Under this proposal, if the employee proceeds in court, the employee
would lose the chance for punitive damages by having rejected the post-dispute
offer to resolve the matter in arbitration, and if the employee does not prevail in
court, the employee would have to pay the attorney’s fees as costs of the
employer from a reasonable date after not accepting the offer.85  If the
employee accepts the post-dispute offer to arbitrate, then the employee can
effectively vindicate all statutory rights in arbitration, including all punitive
83 This is not the first time that I have raised this type of affirmative defense as a possible
methodology to create incentives for employers to agree to arbitration. See id. at 467-68
(suggesting that the offer of a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate would give employers an
affirmative defense to a punitive damages claim).  However, within this Essay, I also add
attorney’s fees and costs as a possible incentive for employers to agree post-dispute while
trying to balance the needs for employees to have fair selection processes and the right to
vindicate all rights that would have been available in court.
84 FED. R. CIV. P. 68.  Professor Danielle Shelton has described Rule 68:
The relevant text of the “Offer of Judgment” rule is as follows:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a claim may
serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against the defending party
for the money or property or to the effect specified in the offer, with costs then accrued.  If
within 10 days after the service of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the offer
is accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of
service thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment.  An offer not accepted shall be
deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine
costs.  If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the
offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer.  The fact that an offer is made
but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer.
Danielle M. Shelton, Rewriting Rule 68:  Realizing the Benefits of the Federal Settlement
Rule by Injecting Certainty into Offers of Judgment, 91 MINN. L. REV. 865, 869 n.6 (2007).
85 Although Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not represent such a fee
shifting statute because it does not explicitly address the payment of attorney’s fees as costs
when an offer of judgment has been rejected and the plaintiff prevails, when a statute allows
recovery of attorney’s fees, then Rule 68 also authorizes recovery of attorney’s fees as part
of the other party’s costs in that situation. See generally Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1
(1985).  By expressly providing in this new legislation that a losing employee who rejected a
post-dispute offer to arbitrate would have to pay the attorney’s fees as costs, it will shift the
employer’s fees to the plaintiff in the courts.  More importantly, it will create incentives to
resolve employment discrimination disputes through post-dispute agreements to arbitrate and
create more incentives for plaintiff’s attorneys to take these claims into arbitration where
attorney’s fees will be more available without their clients having to pay the employer’s
attorney’s fees if they lose.
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damage remedies, costs, and attorney’s fees, which could not be waived
through an agreement to arbitrate.86
2. Rewarding Employees:  Fairer Procedures That Have Substantive
Impacts and Address Difficulties Arising in the Courts
Along with addressing the opportunity for employers to predict costs and
fees more accurately in litigation, Congress must ensure that employees have
all the same remedies available in arbitration that would be available in the
courts.  This would essentially add and codify many of the concerns that neutral
service providers and interested parties have agreed to adopt through the Due
Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Employment Dis-
putes.87  The Due Process Protocol was created ten years ago and needs to be
updated.88  A component of any congressional change must also include the
adoption of fair selection procedures for arbitrators from a cross section of the
population.89  This requirement would also provide employees with the guaran-
tee that arbitrator pools are not stratified on the basis of gender or race.90  With
this process, employers should also be responsible to provide a forum where
the costs are not prohibitive and the employees have a fair opportunity to
engage attorney representation.
C. A Legislative Proposal to Encourage Post-Dispute Agreements to
Arbitrate
With mediation becoming much more of a preferred tool for employers
and after little regulation by courts, service providers, or Congress for more
than fifteen years, if arbitration will have any long term potential for growth in
resolving employment discrimination disputes, the employment discrimination
statutes, the FAA, or both, will have to be amended.  Given the difficulties
86 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract:  Arbitration Agreements and Non-
Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 397-98
(2006) (referring to the “effectively vindicate” doctrine as a creature of the Court’s applica-
tion of the FAA to allow statutory claims to be arbitrated as long as all the rights and reme-
dies available in the courts can be vindicated in arbitration); Ware, supra note 8, at 269-73
(describing the “effectively vindicate” doctrine along with its origins and applications).
87 See Bales, supra note 8, at 341 (describing the Due Process Protocol for Mediation and
Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes, developed by several groups representing
employers, employees, and neutral organizations in 1995, and asserting that “[i]t has been
adopted by the major arbitration service providers” who “will refuse to arbitrate cases under
rules inconsistent with the . . . Protocol”).  For more details about the Due Process Protocol,
see Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at Ten:  Twenty Unresolved
Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 165 (2005).
88 See generally Bales, supra note 87.
89 A few scholars have identified this concern. See generally Sarah Rudolph Cole & E.
Gary Spitko, Arbitration and the Batson Principle, 38 GA. L. REV. 1145 (2004); William B.
Gould IV, Kissing Cousins?:  The Federal Arbitration Act and Modern Labor Arbitration,
55 EMORY L.J. 609 (2006); Michael Z. Green, An Essay Challenging the Racially Biased
Selection of Arbitrators for Employment Discrimination Suits, 4 J. AM. ARB. 1 (2005); E.
Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming:  Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from
Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 275, 312 (1999).
90 See generally Green, supra note 89.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ104.txt unknown Seq: 21 16-JAN-08 13:48
78 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:58
presented by the court system, and because mediation has not demonstrated that
it will be the cure-all it is purported to be,91 Congress should take steps to make
post-dispute arbitration amenable to both employers and employees.
The possibility that Congress might even consider banning pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate may have some new resonance.  Congress recently
passed legislation that protects members of the armed forces from such pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in the consumer setting by stating:
Notwithstanding section 2 of title 9, or any other Federal or State Law, rule, or regu-
lation, no agreement to arbitrate any dispute involving the extension of consumer
credit shall be enforceable against any covered member [of the U.S. armed forces] or
dependent of such a member, or any person who was a covered member or dependent
of that member when the agreement was made.92
Also, United States Senator Jeff Sessions, a Republican from Alabama, has
repeatedly sought to introduce legislation in Congress that would address some
of the concerns for employees and consumers regarding arbitration by amend-
ing the FAA.93  Likewise, United States Senator, Russell Feingold, a Democrat
from Wisconsin, has also made several attempts to pass legislation addressing
pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate under the FAA.94  Given the growing bipar-
tisan interest and the recent enactment of the ban on such agreements for mili-
tary personnel, Congress may finally be ready to attack this issue.95
91 Sherwyn, supra note 67, at 20 (describing how mediation is inadequate as a mechanism
to “curb discrimination and harassment from the workplace”).
92 See John Warner National Defense Reauthorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No.
109-364, 120 Stat. 2083 (2006); see also Posting of Paul Bland to CL&P Blog, http://pubcit.
typepad.com/clpblog/2006/09/defense_departm.html (Sept. 29, 2006) (citing same language
from then proposed legislation and asking whether Congress’s decision to protect military
personnel from the unfair practice of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate might extend to
other consumers).  This bill was passed after a comprehensive Department of Defense report
criticized the use of pre-dispute arbitration. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT ON PREDA-
TORY LENDING PRACTICES DIRECTED AT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR
DEPENDENTS 7, 14, 21, 46, 51 (2006), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/
Report_to_Congress_final.pdf (describing how pre-dispute arbitration of consumer loans to
military personnel should be banned).
93 See Fair Arbitration Act of 2007:  Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions
(2007) (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions), available at http://sessions.senate.gov/pressapp/
record.cfm?id=273715 (describing comments of Senator Sessions as he introduced the Fair
Arbitration Act legislation on April 17, 2007); Press Release, U.S. Senator Jeff Sessions,
U.S. Sen. Jeff Sessions Introduces Fair Arbitration Act of 2007 (Apr. 18, 2007), available at
http://sessions.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm?id=272618 (press release by Senator Sessions
discussing introduced legislation, Fair Arbitration Act of 2007).
94 See generally Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration:  What Process is Due?, 39
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 281 (2002) (describing efforts by Senator Feingold to pass legisla-
tion addressing pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate).  Senator Feingold continues to support
legislation to address pre-dispute agreements. See Press Release, U.S. Senator Russ Fein-
gold, Sen. Feingold, Rep. Johnson Introduce Measure to Preserve Consumer Justice (July 12,
2007), available at http://feingold.senate.gov/~feingold/releases/07/07/20070712.html
(describing actions by Senator Feingold and U.S. Congressman, Henry Johnson, from Geor-
gia, to introduce legislation on July 12, 2007 to ban pre-dispute arbitration agreements).
95 On July 12, 2007, Senator Feingold and Congressman Johnson introduced new legislation
to ban the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in employment and consumer disputes.
See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbitration Fairness Act
of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007) (legislation introduced by Senator Feingold and co-
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Although most of this Essay has addressed the FAA, any congressional
amendments should probably come as changes to Title VII and the other fed-
eral employment discrimination statutes because of the special nature of
employment discrimination disputes.  Changes to the FAA that merely exclude
pre-dispute employment agreements from coverage would not address the com-
prehensive nature and potential for using arbitration to resolve statutory
employment discrimination disputes.  Any attempts to deal with arbitration in
more detail for employment discrimination claims through an amendment to
the FAA would just create confusion in light of the overall breadth of the
FAA’s coverage of many other types of transactions including consumer
matters.
Section 118 of the CRA of 1991 was intended to encourage arbitration of
employment discrimination claims, and it provides an excellent model for fur-
ther legislative action to amend Title VII and other federal employment dis-
crimination statutes.96  That provision states:
Section 118.  Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alter-
native means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation,
facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to
resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by this
title.97
The legislative history behind this ADR provision in the CRA of 1991 did
not clearly indicate whether it was endorsing the use of arbitration as an agreed
condition of employment before a dispute has arisen or only when agreed to
after the dispute has arisen.98  This provision was drafted before Gilmer when
the general understanding was that agreements to arbitrate statutory employ-
ment discrimination claims could not prevent an employee from pursuing reso-
lution in court.99  Because section 118 of the CRA of 1991 failed to clarify
whether it was encouraging pre-dispute or post-dispute agreements to arbitrate,
further congressional changes to this provision of Title VII could easily clarify
Congress’ intent regarding pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate statutory
employment discrimination claims.
sponsored by Democratic U.S. Senator from Illinois, Richard Durbin, as Senate Bill 1782
and introduced in the House of  Representatives by Congressman Johnson, with several
Democratic co-sponsors, as H.R. Bill 3010, which would amend the FAA by prohibiting the
enforcement of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate employment and consumer disputes).
96 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (codified as a
note at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000)).
97 Id.
98 See Sara Lingafelter, Lack of Meaningful Choice Defined:  Your Job vs. Your Right to
Sue in a Judicial Forum, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 803, 821-26 (2005) (describing analysis
and legislative history of the ADR provision in the CRA of 1991, section 118, found at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (2000) (statutory note)). But see EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton &
Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 753 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding the language in the ADR provision to be
unambiguous and thus no need to resort to meaning from legislative history suggesting that
the ADR provision in section 118 of the CRA of 1991 was only intended to have a post-
dispute application).
99 Lingafelter, supra note 98, at 823.
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Thus, the actual language proposed by this Essay would model Section
118 of the CRA of 1991 and would act as an amendment to Title VII and other
employment discrimination statutes enforced by the EEOC100 as follows:
Fair Arbitration Civil Rights Act of 2007.
Section 1.  Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alterna-
tive means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation,
facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to
resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by this
title.
Section 2.  For all agreements to arbitrate claims under these Federal laws to be
enforceable, the dispute must have arisen at the time of entering into the agreement.
Section 3.  If employers offer employees the opportunity to arbitrate after a dispute
arises, this offer will establish an affirmative defense of good faith in response to any
claims for punitive damages available under these laws if the employee rejects this
offer and pursues the claim in court.  Then if the employee does not prevail in court
after rejecting the offer or not accepting it, the employee will pay the employer’s
costs and reasonable attorney’s fees starting at a reasonable time after the offer to
arbitrate was made and not accepted.
Section 4.  To be enforceable, any offer to arbitrate made by an employer must be in
writing and allow the employee all the substantive remedies and rights that would
normally be available to the employee if the matter had been pursued in court without
an offer to arbitrate.  Such terms of the offer shall include but will not be limited to
the right to have an attorney, the right to have costs of paying the arbitrator’s fees and
filing fees not be prohibitive, the right to participate in the selection of the arbitrator
and challenge selections based upon race, gender or any other improper basis, and all
other rights consistent with those available to parties involved in arbitration under the
Federal Arbitration Act.
V. CONCLUSION:  CONGRESSIONAL ACTION NEEDED BEFORE EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION ARBITRATION BECOMES A PASSING FAD
Despite the tremendous growth of arbitration involving statutory employ-
ment discrimination claims over the last fifteen years, any ongoing impact will
require some legislative action.  As employers become more frustrated with the
legal challenges and costs involved in enforcing pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments, their support has started to dissipate.  Unless employers start to see addi-
tional benefits beyond the initial thoughts that arbitration would be a less costly
and faster means for a private, final, and binding resolution, arbitration may
fade into oblivion.  Also, as employers and the EEOC have become more
excited about the prospects from mediation, arbitration has become a little used
tool in the employment dispute resolution tool bag.
Although post-dispute agreements to arbitrate statutory employment dis-
crimination claims present no more of a concern than private agreements to
settle such claims, some scholars have argued that employers and employees
have little incentive to enter into these agreements.  Whether these arguments
correctly predict employer and employee behavior, Congress can change the
playing field by offering incentives that will make employers and employees
100 See Laws Enforced by the EEOC, supra note 30.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ104.txt unknown Seq: 24 16-JAN-08 13:48
Fall 2007] POST-DISPUTE AGREEMENTS 81
willing to consider post-dispute agreements to arbitrate statutory employment
discrimination claims.  By providing employers with more predictable out-
comes in limiting punitive damages as an affirmative defense and limiting their
costs and attorney’s fees if an employee does not prevail in court after rejecting
the employer’s written offer to arbitrate after a dispute arises, employers will be
motivated to offer such agreements.  Likewise, by also requiring that employ-
ees must receive fair procedures in selecting arbitrators, paying for the costs of
arbitration, being provided attorneys, and being afforded other process guaran-
tees that may affect their substantive rights, employees will have a similar
motivation to accept such agreements given the unpleasant prospects available
through the courts.
Congress can provide employers and employees with a win-win opportu-
nity by expanding the potential that arbitration can have in resolving statutory
employment discrimination claims.  Given that the impact of arbitration has
started to reach a desperate crossroads regarding its continued use in the
employment setting, only Congress can truly resolve the issues that have arisen
since the 1991 Gilmer decision.  Because statutory employment discrimination
claims represent a unique issue, the best way for Congress to address this mat-
ter would be through an amendment to Title VII and other federal employment
discrimination statutes rather than a change to the FAA.  Regardless of how it
is done, Congress must address the judicial expansion of the FAA to statutory
claims that has occurred over the last twenty years.  And when it comes to the
issues regarding arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims that
have evolved with the expansion of FAA enforcement, Congress has to act in
enough time to save arbitration as a vital tool that both employers and employ-
ees can use to resolve these disputes.
